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NAELA White Paper on
Long-Term Care Reform
The current system for addressinglongterm care is a non-system. It is a
hodgepodge of services that fails to
meet its intended needs and is economically inefficient. This White Paper
analyzes the problems and proposes
recommendations to serve as policy
solutions for citizens and government.
By the NAELA Long-Term Care
Task Force
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. Introduction
Although long-term care is a problem that affects all
economic strata in the United States, financing longterm care is a uniquely middle-class problem. The
time has come for the citizens and the government
of the United States to address the issues of the delivery, accessibility, and financing of long-term care
in our country.
Long-term care refers to a wide range of medical
and personal services needed by individuals who have
lost some capacity of caring for themselves due to
functional limitations or chronic health conditions.
These services include skilled nursing care, subacute
care, respite care, rehabilitation, and assistance with
activities of daily living, such as transferring, bathing, dressing, toileting, meal preparation, and
housekeeping. These services can be provided in a
variety of settings including nursing facilities, assisted-living facilities, adult day care facilities,
congregate living facilities, continuing care retirement
communities, or one's own home.
The current system of financing medical care favors acute care and disfavors chronic care and is thus
disease discriminatory. Most Americans with chronic
illnesses impoverish themselves paying for their care,
at which point Medicaid pays for their care. For example, bypass surgery is covered by Medicare.
However, Alzheimer's disease is not covered under
Medicare, and an Alzheimer's victim must become
destitute before receiving Medicaid coverage.

2. Purpose
The purpose of this White Paper is to identify the
key components to the long-term care system, to
analyze the problems that exist within its current
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structure, and to present recommendations to serve
as policy solutions for our citizens and government.
To ensure access to quality and cost-efficient longterm health care for all Americans, now and in the
future, the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys' advocates for a comprehensive reform of the
long-term health care system. This White Paper is
divided into four sections:
" Development of a continuum of care
" Private financing of long-term care
" Public financing of long-term care
" Administration of the long-term care system

3. Elements of the Proposal
3.1. The Current System
The current system in our country for addressing
long-term care is a non-system, a hodgepodge of services that fails to meet the needs of the elderly and
disabled in the variety of long-term care settings. It
is economically inefficient, and it fails to assure the
quality of services that are provided.
The principal problem with the existing longterm care delivery system is that its major focus is
on nursing home care, which is the most expensive
level of care. Additionally, the system is fragmented
among the elderly and those with mental retardation and developmental disabilities.
At a minimum, the necessary continuum of care
should be a fully integrated system of medical and
personal services provided to individuals who have
lost some capacity for caring for themselves. Services
should include:
"
"
"
"

"
"
"
"
"
"

Skilled nursing care;
Rehabilitative services;
Respite care;
Personal assistance with the activities of daily
living (bathing, toileting, dressing, meal preparation, and housekeeping);
Congregate living arrangements;
Adult day care services;
Assisted-living facilities;
Home care;
Nursing home custodial care;
Hospice care.

Care should be coordinated by care managers
trained to assess an individual's condition, to develop
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a written plan of care, to implement and coordinate
a care plan, to monitor services, to make appropriate reassessments, and to discharge an individual
when services are no longer required, similar to that
done in the PACE programs.
3.2. Private Financing of Long-Term Care
Currently, the primary source of private financing
of long-term care is the income and savings of the
elderly and disabled and their families. Although
long-term care insurance only pays for approximately
three percent of the nation's nursing home costs, this
type of insurance can play an important role in helping to provide protection against the cost of long-term
care for the elderly and disabled since it would likely
reduce government involvement and expense. However, before long-term care insurance can be
considered a viable option in the financing of longterm care, there are intrinsic concerns about the
product that must be addressed and improved or it
will continue playing a limited role:
"
"
"
"

Lack of public awareness;
Cost of premiums;
Confusion over policy options;
Insurability.

3.3. Public Financing of Long-Term Care
NAELA proposes that long-term care be financed by a
system of social insurance known as Medicare Part D.
The Part D benefit would provide each beneficiary with
a pool of money (i.e., $200,000 in the year 2000 and
indexed for inflation) to be used as needed at any level
on the continuum of care. There would be a $10,000
deductible, after which Medicare would pay eighty
percent of the cost of care. After the pool of money is
exhausted, the beneficiary would pay privately or
through private insurance. The Medicaid program
would pay for care for those unable to afford private
payment or to purchase private insurance.
The Part D benefit would be financed by contributions from an increased payroll tax dedicated to
the Medicare Part D trust fund and by dedicating
receipts from the Federal Estate and Gift Tax to the
trust fund. The benefit would be phased in over
twenty years, with one-half of the benefit becoming
available in ten years and the second half becoming
available in twenty years.
To be eligible a beneficiary would have lost the
ability to perform a minimum of two activities of
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daily living (ADLs) as determined by a care manager.
The person must be sixty-five years of age or disabled
or be the spouse or child of a wage earner if the spouse
or child is sixty-five years of age or disabled. The wage
earner must have forty quarters of coverage (QC).
3.4. Medicaid Reform
NAELA proposes that the Medicare Part D program
and the Medicaid program be administered in a
manner similar to the current Medicare model. A
strong audit system to insure compliance would be
required, and a uniform federal standard of eligibility as under Medicare should be adopted.
Reimbursement rates to providers must be fairly
determined and administered, based on accurate cost
information that reflects geographic considerations
and severity of conditions. Additionally, due process
requirements must always be observed.
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ELDER LAW
ATTORNEYS WHITE PAPER ON REFORMING
THE DELIVERY, ACCESSIBILITY AND
FINANCING OF LONG-TERM CARE IN THE
UNITED STATES
1. Introduction
Although long-term care is a problem affecting all
economic strata in the United States, financing longterm care is a uniquely middle-class problem. Acute
care is financed by the existing Medicare system, but
chronic care is expensive, and a significant portion
of the elderly who require such care must often bankrupt themselves in order to qualify for Medicaid. The
time has come for the citizens and the government
of the United States to address the issues of the delivery, accessibility, and financing of long-term care
in our country. Long-term care refers to a wide range
of medical and personal services needed by individuals who have lost some capacity of caring for
themselves due to functional limita- tions or chronic
health conditions. These services include skilled nursing care, subacute care, rehabilitation, respite care,
and personal assistance with activities of daily living, such as transferring, bathing, dressing, toileting,
continence, meal preparation, and housekeeping.
These services can be provided in a variety of settings including nursing facilities, assisted-living
facilities, adult day care facilities, congregate living
facilities, continuing care retirement communities,
or one's own home.2
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Science, technology, nutrition, and other factors
have increased life expectancy and set our nation on
a course for a major expansion of the midlife and
older populations. One hundred years ago, at the
beginning of the twentieth century, the average life
expectancy in this country was less than fifty years.
Now, at the beginning of this century, the average
life expectancy is almost eighty.' The blessing of
longer life means that diseases of aging that require
long-term or custodial care, such as Alzheimer's disease, are more prevalent. The population of persons
age sixty-five and over, and also of persons age eighty
and over, is expected to almost double in the next
quarter century.4 This means that more people will
require long-term care. Although long-term care is
primarily a need of the aged, chronic diseases such
as AIDS and accidents causing paralysis affect all
ages, and forty percent of persons using long-term
care services are between the ages of eighteen and
sixty-five. s
Further complicating the picture is the changing
of the nuclear family. At one time, the aging parent
would move into the adult child's home for care,
where one spouse worked and the other stayed home.
Now, when an aging parent moves into an adult
child's home for care, it is a two-earner household
and less able to care for another family member.
Long-term care is expensive. According to the
U.S. Census Bureau, the average cost of a stay in a
nursing facility is $51,000 a year ($140/day), and
the average length of stay is 2.3 years.6 This cost can
be $73,000 a year ($200/day) or more in large urban areas.7 Neither private health insurance nor
Medicare covers the costs of most long-term care
services. According to the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA), in 1996 only about eleven
percent of nursing home revenues were derived from
Medicare and Medicare supplemental insurance.'
With recent changes in Medicare reimbursement
methodologies, Medicare may pay even less.9 As a
consequence, persons requiring long-term care must
pay for this care from their own savings until they
are sufficiently impoverished to qualify for Medicaid. Thirty-seven percent of nursing home
expenditures are paid for by residents' income and
savings. 10 Persons requiring facility-based long-term
care must spend down their assets to $2,000.11 The
high cost of nursing home care has resulted in more
than fifty percent of those persons who enter a nursing home paying privately for services until their
resources are exhausted; they then rely on the
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federal-state Medicaid program for care. 12 In 1997
alone, Medicaid spent $56.1 billion on long-term
care, including $32.5 billion for nursing home services and $10 billion for intermediate care facility
expenses for the mentally retarded. 13 Medicaid thus
has become the primary payer for long-term care in
our country, causing a tremendous strain on federal
and state budgets.
As stated previously, long-term care is not just a
problem for the elderly. It is an intergenerational issue. According to American Association of Retired
Persons (AARP), using a broad definition of functional disability, it is estimated that 11.5 million
individuals of all ages have disabilities severe enough
to require long-term care. Of those 11.5 million individuals, 5.7 million are children and persons 18 to
64 years old, and 5.8 million are persons 65 years
old and older.14 There are approximately 1.8 million
nursing home beds in the United States with more
than 1.5 million individuals residing in nursing
homes.'5 About four percent of all persons sixty-five
years of age or older live in nursing homes, 16 but
fifteen percent of those over age eighty-five live in
nursing homes.1 7 With the aging of the baby boom
generation and rapidly falling mortality rates for the
elderly, these numbers will increase exponentially
over the next thirty years. This will lead to significant public and private spending to meet this demand
for nursing home care.
According to a researcher at the Health Insurance Association of America, it is difficult to know
how many Americans currently have long-term care
insurance, but it is estimated that as of the end of
1998, about six percent of Americans have purchased
a policy at some time in the past.' 8 Many experts
believe that most Americans cannot afford long-term
care insurance and that many of those who apply
are uninsurable. 19 What is known is that private
insurance currently pays for less than seven percent
20
of long-term care services.
Given the aforementioned description of some
of the long-term care financing realities in the United
States, one could certainly argue that the current
system of financing medical care favors acute care
and disfavors chronic care and is thus disease discriminatory. Most Americans with chronic illnesses
impoverish themselves paying for their care, and then
Medicaid. pays for their care. For example, bypass
surgery is paid for by Medicare. However, a person
with Alzheimer's disease does not have longterm coverage for his or her care under Medicare
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and must become destitute before receiving Medicaid coverage.
The existing long-term care system lacks many,
if not most, of the features that the system should
have. Perhaps the greatest failing of the current system is the focus of available resources on care in the
most acute and expensive setting, the nursing home.
This focus has resulted in the wholly inadequate development and support of long-term care in other
settings, including people's own homes and less restrictive residential settings such as assisted-living
facilities and board-and-care homes. This focus minimizes personal independence and maximizes cost.
The limited long-term care services that do exist
outside of nursing homes are underfunded, riddled
with gaps in essential services, and virtually bereft
of quality assurance.
Compounding the problems created by the failure to focus on the full continuum of long-term care
is the division of the delivery system based on type
of disability. Parallel, but unequal, long-term care
delivery mechanisms have been established to serve
the developmentally disabled, the younger physically
disabled, veterans, the elderly, those with mental
health issues, and persons with AIDS, to name but a
few. These divisions have pitted groups against each
other to compete for dollars and have led to indefensible inequities and significant economic
inefficiencies.
In theory, long-term care is something that should
be insurable. According to the WashingtonPost, sixty
percent of persons will require long-term care sometime in their lives.2 ' According to the New England
Journal of Medicine, twenty-six percent will stay
three months or less, nineteen percent three months
to one year, thirty-four percent one to five years, and
twenty-one percent will stay five years or more.22
Thus, while not everyone will require long-term care,
those who do may have to spend significant resources. The spreading of risk through insurance may
make sense. Persons who are fully covered under
long-term care insurance would not need to spend
their life savings, and the government would not have
to provide benefits under Medicaid. Although longterm care insurance began to be offered to the public
in the 1980s, according to HCFA, in 1995 only three
percent of all nursing home costs were paid by longterm care insurance. 23 The American Council of
Life Insurance estimates that, today, only six million Americans have purchased long-term care
24
insurance.
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Medicaid is the largest public source of funding
for long-term care in the United States. It accounted
for more than thirty-eight percent of total long-term
care expenditures in 1996. Medicaid spending for longterm care has more than doubled from 1987 to 1997,
rising from $21.1 billion to $56.1 billion. In 1996, four
percent of the Medicaid budget was spent on nursing
home care and five percent was spent on home care.25
This White Paper identifies the key components
to the long-term care system, analyzes the problems
that exist within its current structure, and presents
recommendations that serve as policy solutions for
our citizens and government. To ensure access to
quality and cost-efficient long-term health care for
all Americans, now and in the future, the National
Academy of Elder Law Attorneys advocates for
a comprehensive reform of our long-term health
care system. This White Paper is divided into four
sections:
" Development of a continuum of care;
" Private financing of long-term care;
" Public financing of long-term care;
" Administration of the long-term care system.

1.1. Concepts Central to the Long-Term Care
Discussion
Over the years there have been many of proposals
to fix the long-term care financing and delivery systems. Some of the primary concepts included the
following:
" Social insurance in the form of a comprehensive
Social Security-like approach, where all contribute though the workplace and comprehensive
long-term care benefits are not means-tested.
" Limited social insurance in the form of variations on the above theme, including some
means-testing for benefits, a capped entitlement,
participation for workers only, cost sharing of
premiums, etc.
" Voluntary public long-term care insurance or a
public disability insurance program, possibly limited to certain age groups or offered as a one-time
decision at retirement or another age.
" Social services programs, either means tested (SSItype) or not (Older Americans Act-type).
" Medicaid expansion to cover a larger percentage of those who cannot afford private long-term
care insurance, or to cover all long-term care services (e.g., respite care, adult day care).

" Merging of Medicare acute care coverage with
Medicaid to cover the range of long-term care
needs.
" Tax credits and deductions for long-term care
costs and/or long-term care insurance.
" Modifications in Social Security, including credits for caregiver years.
" Tax incentives for employers to provide elder care
programs.
" Individual or personal retirement accounts,
where employers and employees create long-term
care savings or annuities and are given tax incentives to do so.
1.2. Suggested Principles to Guide
Recommendations
NAELA provides a set of principles to guide our recommendations for the public sector role in long-term
care.
" Long-term care services should be available to
all Americans who need them, even if they cannot afford such services. Criteria for eligibility
should be related to the individual's physical,
mental, or cognitive functioning.
* Services should be comprehensive-both community-based and institutional. They should be
provided in the least restrictive setting possible.
Services should be supportive of caregivers and
offer respite care.
" Risk should be shared as in the social insurance
model, at least for those that cannot afford private alternatives.
" Financing should include specific designated
taxes and premiums that are reserved in a trust
fund for long-term care coverage.
" The private sector should be allowed to build on
this public sector foundation with its own products that would be regulated by the public sector.
" The federal government in partnership with states
and the private sector should take responsibility
for quality assurance systems for both institutionalbased and community-based long-term care.
2. Toward a Continuum of Long-Term Care
2.1. Assessment
Universal assessment tools must be developed and
adopted to identify the nature and scope of needs
regardless of disability. This will contribute to a level
playing field among the various types of disabilities
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and will allow the focus of resources based on need
rather than history or politics.
2.2. Development of Alternatives to
Institutionalization
Delivery mechanisms must be established to deliver
long-term care at all care levels-from one's own home,
to minimally intrusive residential settings, to settings
other than nursing homes for persons needing substantial assistance that can be more effectively provided
outside of a nursing home (e.g., family homes serving
physically healthy persons with advanced dementia).
Standards of care need to be developed for these levels, including staffing, training, and facility standards.
Resources need to follow the assessed needs of individuals so that appropriate revenue streams are
available for these alternative settings.
2.3. Quality Assurance
Effective and appropriate quality assurance mechanisms for care in settings other than nursing homes
must be developed. Certainly additional licensing and
certification requirements are needed, but more flexible quality assurance vehicles such as ombudsmen
might address this need. For example, regulation of
assisted-living facilities is lax and a regulatory framework similar to the Nursing Home Reform Act needs
to be considered.
2.4. Care Coordination
Mechanisms must be established to coordinate the
provision of all long-term care services so that the
right package of services is made available based on
need. The pivotal role of the care manager must be
recognized, empowered, and financed. This will involve tying together the functions of assessing need,
authorizing services, and allocating the resources
necessary to carry out the plan.
2.5. Support of Informal Provision of Long-Term
Care
Family and other informal providers of long-term
care need to be supported. This involves at least the
provision of training, ongoing counseling and support, and the provision of respite care for breaks and
vacations, etc.
2.6. Quality of Care: A Public Role
The federal and state governments also play
major roles in the quality of long-term care. Under the Nursing Home Reform Law,26 the federal

government has set national quality standards for
nursing homes and is responsible for enforcing those
standards, although enforcement is uneven. State
governments license nursing homes, board-and-care
facilities, and assisted-living facilities and variations
thereon (e.g., domiciliary care facilities, residential
care facilities, life care facilities, continuing care retirement communities, and other adult foster care
facilities). Some of the licensing is effective in keeping standards high. The remainder is not, leaving
millions of elderly and disabled individuals vulnerable to the squalor of the facilities in which they must
live; and in some cases, their very lives are at risk.
3. Private Financing of Long-Term Care
3.1. Private Insurance as a Long-Term Care
FinancingStrategy
3.1.1. The Role of Personal Savings
Saving to purchase long-term care services is not the
same as using an insurance vehicle that pays for the
care when it is needed. Not everyone will need the
services and the cost will vary depending on the condition. It would be a coincidence if one saved for
long-term care services and accurately saved the
amount that was needed. A very small percentage of
persons age seventy-four to eighty-four have saved
enough to cover two years of nursing home care.
For most people, it is likely that the cost of their care
would be greater than the amount that they could
save, and saving involves forgoing other possibilities for one's family. People are expected to insure
(either themselves or through a public program)
against the cost of care for a heart attack and not to
give up their homes or all their savings, but the same
is not expected in the area of long-term care. One
might say that Medicaid is the ultimate high deductible insurance policy for long-term care.
3.1.2. Insurance
Long-term care is certainly an insurable event. Only
a small percentage of elderly people will spend any
significant time in a nursing home. 27 Therefore, the
risk is relatively low for nursing home needs. The
high and rising costs of long-term care are usually
far beyond the amount one has saved for retirement.
3.1.3. Affordability
By most estimates, only ten to twenty percent
of the elderly can afford private long-term care
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insurance.28 In fact, coverage is most affordable for
those who would never spend down to Medicaid and
therefore will not have a great impact on Medicaid
expenditures over time. A public insurance program
could be paid through taxes, either on income or on
wages and salaries.
3.2. Long-Term Care Insurance Plans

Today, long-term care insurance policies offer consumers flexibility and comprehensive coverage in all
current settings and provide for future developments
in long-term care through their "alternate plan of
care" provisions.
Most policies are now fashioned after a "pool of
dollars" concept and pay for care in any combination of settings, in any order of need, with no
requirement for prior hospitalization. They cover, up
to certain limits chosen by the insured, costs of longterm care incurred in either the community setting
(home health care and adult day care) or in facilities
(assisted-living facilities and nursing homes). The
insured can choose, at the time of application, the
cap on the daily amount that will be covered (daily
benefit amount), the benefit period, elimination period, and type of inflation protection. The daily
benefit cap and benefit length together determine the
amount of dollars in the spending account for longterm care (e.g., a 3-year policy at $100 per day equals
3 x 365 x $100 = $109,500 in the spending account).
The elimination period is the number of days the
insured will pay for care out-of-pocket before the
policy begins to pay (same as a deductible), and the
inflation rider protects the daily dollar maximums.
The policies can thus be customized for the insured,
taking into account age, health, assets, income, risk
29
tolerance, etc.
Coverage varies and may include payment of the
costs of the insured's assisted-living or nursing care
facility while home for a visit or in hospital; training
for family members who want to provide some or
all of the care; survivorship benefits for the remaining spouse; accelerated payment options for those
who wish a fixed term to their premium payments
(a good option for those still working); payments to
change the home environment to make it safer for
the insured to remain there as long as possible; greater
flexibility in who can be paid to provide the care at
home, extending in some cases even to family members or neighbors; and care management to help
line up the care and/or equipment needed at home.
Some policies provide spousal discounts to commit-
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ted partners, recognizing that today's households
come in many different sizes and shapes.
3.3. Reasons Long-Term Care Insurance Is
Beneficial
For the person requiring long-term care and his or
her family, a properly selected long-term care insurance policy will allow a policyholder to protect his
or her life savings from depletion if long-term care is
provided. Because insurance pays the cost of care, it
may be more likely that a person will utilize at-home
care, rather than choose nursing home care.
For government policy makers, a mechanism for
persons to self-pay and spread the risk rather than
rely on public benefits, would relieve a strain on taxpayer dollars. However, it is uncertain whether
government expenditures associated with encouraging more persons to purchase long-term care
insurance will be cost effective or otherwise in the
public interest.
3.4. Problems with Current Long-Term Care
Insurance Plans
3.4.1. Lack of Public Awareness
The public is unaware of the need to plan for longterm care. For example, seventy-three percent of
Americans incorrectly thought Medicare is the primary funding source for long-term care.30 Perhaps
as importantly, employers also appear to be unaware
of the option of offering long-term care insurance as
part of their employee benefits package.
3.4.2. Cost of Premiums
Those consumers who want to purchase long-term
care insurance are confronted with additional problems. One is cost. The industry suggests a minimum
annual income of $35,000 and assets of at least
$100,000-2 percent of annual income-devoted to
purchase long-term care insurance. Individuals above
the $5 million asset range may be able to self-insure.
Long-term care insurance premiums are calculated based on the age of the person at the time the
premium is first purchased. Although premiums are
generally level, that is, they do not automatically
increase as a policyholder gets older, the older the
applicant, the higher the premium. The average annual cost of a policy that provides a $100 per day
nursing home benefit, 50 percent for home health
care, 4-year benefit period, and 20-day elimination
period ranges from $247 to $805 for a 40-year-old,
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$364 to $1,200 for a 50-year-old, $980 to $2,432
for a 65-year-old, and $3,967 to $7,740 for a 79year-old. The higher-cost policies typically include a
five percent compounded inflation adjustment to protect the policyholder from increases in the cost of
covered long-term care services. Also available for
higher premiums are nonforfeiture benefits, which
return some portion of the value of premiums invested to the policyholder if the policy is ever
dropped.
Although premiums are most affordable for persons in their forties and fifties, these individuals may
have other priorities, such as home mortgages and
the care and education of their children. A survey of
baby boomers sponsored by the American Health
Care Association revealed that fifty-six percent of
respondents did not know that Medicare does not
cover long-term care expenses, and sixty-eight percent admitted that they were not financially prepared
for long-term care needs.3 1 The realization that premiums may be paid for thirty or more years before
benefits are realized may also discourage interest.
Premiums are calculated to be level so that a premium is set based on the policyholder's age at the
time of purchase of the policy, with persons purchasing at a younger age paying less than persons who
purchase at an older age. However, some long-term
insurers have raised premiums for the entire class of
policyholders, effectively defeating the level aspect
of the price, and potentially discouraging younger
32
persons from purchasing policies.
By the time individuals realize that long-term care
may be needed, premiums may be unaffordable. By
the insurance industry's own estimates, less than onethird of Americans over age sixty-five can afford a
policy. 33 Moreover, less than half of persons age
thirty-five to forty-four can afford a policy with five
years of coverage.34 The Employee Benefit Research
Institute also notes that some experts believe that
long-term care insurance growth may be limited because only a small portion of those most likely to
need long-term care insurance-the elderly-can
35
afford it.
Applicants must go through an underwriting
process. It is estimated that one in four persons who
apply for long-term care insurance cannot qualify
36
due to preexisting health conditions.
While modest federal income tax deductions are
available, as well as tax credits in some states, it is
unclear whether sufficient incentives are available to
encourage the purchase of long-term care insurance.
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The Health Insurance Portability and Affordability
Act of 199631 includes incentives to purchase longterm care insurance.3" Premiums for long-term care
insurance are treated as a medical expense. The deduction is limited to $210 for persons 40 years of
age or under to $2,660 for persons 70 years of age
or over. However, medical expenses are deductible
only to the extent that they exceed 7.5 percent of
adjusted gross income. As a result, most people who
are healthy enough to obtain the insurance do not
have sufficient medical expenses to realize the deduction. Those who have sufficient medical expenses
to realize the deduction are not healthy enough to
obtain the insurance. In 1999 The Wall Street Journal reported that fewer than four percent of taxpayers
39
are able to meet this threshold.
3.4.3. Consumer Confusion over Policy Options
A myriad of plan options makes it difficult for a consumer to select a policy. In addition, there are a
number of variations, including benefits, payments,
terms, and the fiscal soundness of the company to
consider.
3.4.3.1. Variation on Amount of Benefits
Policies vary on the amount of benefits offered. Benefits are typically paid on a per-diem basis. A
beneficiary can select, for example, a $100 a day
benefit or, for a higher premium, a $150 a day benefit. The optimal benefit is one that will cover all of
one's out-of-pocket costs for all types of care provided while coordinating with other payment sources
that may be available, such as Social Security or pension benefits.
3.4.3.2. The Insurer
As with all insurance products, the soundness of the
insurer may vary. Since long-term care insurance
could be purchased many years before a claim is
made, the fiscal quality of the company is an important variable.
3.4.3.3. Payment Benefit
Payments may be by actual reimbursement or a fixed
daily rate. There may be daily or monthly maxi40
mums.
3.4.3.4. Inflation Protection
Benefits may or may not factor in the cost of inflation. Inflation protection riders can be purchased that
increase the daily maximum automatically by five
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percent of the original daily maximum (simple inflator) or five percent of the prior year's amount
(compound inflator). Also available are cost-of-living inflators, which allow insureds to purchase
additional coverage under certain circumstances.
3.4.3.5. Variation in Elimination Periods Before Policy
Goes into Effect
Plans offer a wide variety of options regarding when
the payments begin. The longer the waiting period,
the lower the premium. Plans qualified for tax deductions must be coordinated with Medicare
payments and will not begin to pay benefits until
Medicare is unavailable, so a day one qualified policy
really means day one after Medicare payments cease.
3.4.3.6. Lack of Understanding of the Difference
Between Qualified and Nonqualified Plans
The word qualified in this instance refers to plans
that qualify for the 1996 federal HIPAA tax benefits. The industry itself is unsure as to which plan is
better. Nonqualified policies often contain benefit
triggers that make it easier for insureds to qualify
for benefits. While qualified plans clearly provide
that benefits paid under the policies are nontaxable,
it is less clear whether benefits paid under
nonqualified plans are taxable.
3.4.3.7. Variation in Length of Benefits
Policies can be customized to provide for different
payout periods. The length that benefits are
paid will depend on the cost of care provided and
the policy length chosen (e.g., three years or four
years or unlimited). For example, most persons may
not stay in a nursing home more than four years,
so a nursing home-only policy may not need a
longer benefit period. However, a comprehensive
policy that includes home care or assisted living may
need to cover a longer period of time because the
latter types of care may be needed prior to nursing
home entry.
3.4.3.8. Types of Services Covered
Long-term care is more than just nursing home care.
Most policies offer options that include at-home care
and assisted living. However, services evolve over
time so it may be difficult to know what will be
needed in thirty years. Some plans may offer alternate plans of care to meet new, unforeseen care
needs.
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3.4.3.9. Protection Against Lapse in Case the
Purchaser Forgets to Pay the Premium

In order for long-term care insurance policies to be
approved for sale, many states require some protection against lapse if the purchaser forgets to pay the
premium.
3.4.3.10. Medical Eligibility

Policies require medical underwriting. Each insurer
has its own criteria as to who qualifies for the best
rates, who is accepted but at higher premiums, and
who is rejected.
3.5. The Partnership for Long-Term Care:
The Model Revisited
In the late 1980s, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation initiated a national program called the
Partnership for Long-Term Care. The program
sought to combine the efforts of the public and private sectors and to promote long-term care planning
options for individuals, as well as comprehensive case
management and data analysis. The partnership involves an alliance between state governments and
private insurers to offer private insurance policies
that are affordable to a broad range of individuals.
Under the direction of a national program office
at the University of Maryland Center on Aging, Partnership programs have been implemented in four
states: California, Connecticut, Indiana, and New
York. Implementation was phased in over twentyeight months, although each state began selling
policies at different times: Connecticut in April 1992,
New York in April 1993, Indiana in May 1993, and
California in August 1994.41 Partnership policies
blend private and public insurance in a unique way.
All four states use private long-term care insurance
to cover the initial costs of long-term care. Consumers who purchase policies that meet state certification
standards can become eligible for Medicaid long-term
care services after their private insurance is exhausted, without spending down all their assets
as is typically required to meet Medicaid eligibility
criteria.
Two program models have been developed, the
dollar-for-dollarmodel, adopted in California and
Connecticut, and the total assets model adopted in
New York. Under the dollar-for-dollar model, consumers purchase an amount of private insurance
coverage equal to the amount of assets they wish to
protect. The model permits a variety of product de-
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signs ranging from one year of coverage on up. Under
the New York total assets model, consumers must purchase a policy that covers three years of nursing home
care, six years of home care, or some combination (with
two days of home care equaling one day of nursing
home care), after which the beneficiary becomes eligible for Medicaid coverage without the need to dispose
of any remaining assets.42
Indiana, originally a dollar-for-dollar state, began offering a hybrid model in March 1998. Under
the hybrid model, consumers who purchase policies
meeting a state-set dollar amount of coverage receive
total asset protection, while those who purchase less
43
coverage receive dollar-for-dollar protection.
While each state differs in the specifics of their
model, all must achieve similar goals:
1. Increase the percentage of middle class individuals with insurance that protects against
impoverishment from long-term care expenses;
2. Constrain the growth of public expenditures for
long-term care;
3. Improve the quality and availability of private
long-term care insurance products;
4. Improve the quality and availability of consumer
information on long-term care costs and options;
and
5. Establish a public-use database on long-term care
service utilization based on the use of private
44
insurance .
Instead of emphasizing estate recoveries, Congress should repeal the estate recovery legislation
adopted in 199345 and encourage the states to adopt
public-private partnership models to facilitate the sale
of long-term care insurance. Any monies collected
under the estate recovery program will be significantly outweighed by cost savings achieved from
increased sales of long-term care insurance.
3.6. Limited Role of Long-Term Care Insurance
Long-term care insurance is an important way for
persons to finance their need for long-term care.
Certain segments of the population will never be able
to afford long-term care insurance, and other funding sources such as Medicaid need to remain in place.
As the cost of premiums increase with age, older
persons are more likely to fall into this category. Insurers will not be willing to offer insurance to another
group of individuals who may be able to afford long-
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term care insurance but are considered unacceptable
risks-again, older persons are more likely to fall
into this category. For these individuals, Medicaid
must remain in place as the imperfect but dependable safety net.
Strong educational programs are needed to encourage people in their forties and fifties to purchase
long-term care insurance. Long-term care insurance
should be restructured as Medigap-type policies,
standardized with clearly defined benefits and
options.
The long-term care insurance industry needs to
offer simplified and more understandable policy
options. The industry should consider allowing all
persons up to a certain age to qualify for long-term
care insurance without medical underwriting.
The federal government has offered very modest
tax incentives to encourage the purchase of longterm care insurance, but it is unclear how successful
these incentives have been. It is uncertain whether additional tax incentives will actually save Medicaid
expenditures. It is possible that such deductions will
encourage people to purchase long-term care insurance
who would not have applied for Medicaid in any event.

4. The Public Role In Financing Long-Term
Care
4.1. General Public Program Recommendations
NAELA recommends that the Medicare program be
expanded to become the primary provider of longterm care based on level of disability (physical,
mental, cognitive). It should be financed through the
current system with increases in the payroll tax and
premiums and through dedication of receipts from
the Federal Estate and Gift Tax.
4.1.1. Elements
" The program should be progressively financed,
with protections for low-income persons, by use
of cost sharing with a sliding fee scale.
" The expansion should not favor institutional care.
" The current aging network (Older Americans
Act) and other service providers (Social Services
Block Grant) should be used to expand availability of community-based long-term care
services, including respite care and adult day care.
" The provision of community-based services under Medicaid for low-income individuals should
be mandated.
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" Financial assistance to caregivers should be pro-

vided through tax credits and deductions.
" HCFA enforcement of nursing home regulations
should be improved and quality assurance programs expanded to cover assisted-living and
other facilities providing long-term care.
" The ombudsman program should be expanded
to cover these facilities and be provided with the
necessary funding.
" The program should ensure that states address
the quality concerns that come with capitated
long-term care programs.
" The program should mandate and reimburse for
appropriate care management, including a comprehensive assessment of beneficiaries' needs and
discharge planning.
" Medicaid reimbursement should be increased to
ensure that it is sufficient to cover appropriate
labor costs in long-term care facilities.
4.2. Medicare and Medicaid Program Specific
Discussion
4.2.1. Medicare as Part of the Services PictureNot a Comprehensive Benefit, But Definitely a Place
to Start
4.2.1.1. Home Health Care
Home health care, from its inception, has been part
of a constellation of Medicare services, including
hospital and post-hospital care, that comprise a defined set of acute care services. 46 Moreover, home
health care, which started out as an open-ended benefit,4 7 is now limited to one hundred visits under Part
A for persons who have both Medicare Parts A and
B, with additional necessary services available under Part B. 48 This new arrangement functions
primarily as a financing scheme to save costs to the
Part A Medicare Trust Fund.49
For persons with Part A only, or for persons with
Part B only, there is no specific visit limit on access
to home health care, 0 although other payment and
coverage rules and home health agency practices significantly restrict access to this important benefit.5 1
Similarly, there is no specific home health visit limit
under Part B for persons eligible for Parts A and B
who have exhausted the one hundred-visit limit
52
under Part A.
4.2.1.2. Home Health and Hospice
With respect to hospice services, there is no longer a
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limit on the number of times that an individual can
be recertified for this benefit, including two
periods of ninety days and an unlimited number of
subsequent periods of sixty days, 3 extending the hospice benefit considerably. Of late, however, there has
been a greater utilization of in-home hospice services
as a vehicle for extending home health services, often provided by the same home health agency,
particularly where agencies seek to stay within costcaps under the Medicare home health care benefit.
This utilization pattern is likely to be scrutinized for
fraud, abuse, and overutilization s4
4.2.1.3. Other Part B Services
Access to other services under Part B, ss including

physician services, x-ray and other diagnostic services, and durable medical equipment, are more
open-ended; although access and utilization is limited by strict coverage and payment rules.

6

In

addition, therapeutic services such as physical and
occupational
services are limited by annual payment
7
caps.1

4.2.1.4. Medicare+Choice (New Medicare Part C)
With respect to Medicare covered services provided
through the Medicare+Choice program, new Medicare Part C,s8 there is great reliance on managed care
organizations (MCOs) for the provision of Medicare covered services.5 9 While MCOs must provide
Medicare beneficiaries the services available under
Medicare Parts A and B, 60 these organizations, working under a capitated payment system, strictly control
utilization and access to services, often raising concerns about the quality of care received. 61 Of late,
many MCOs have dropped their Medicare products,
leaving many beneficiaries without a Medicare managed care option.
4.2.1.5. Chronic Care Currently Available
Although routinely denied, coverage for chronic con62
ditions is available under the Medicare program.
Generally, a chronic condition is one for which there
is little likelihood of medical improvement and for
which medical services, including physical or other
therapeutic services are necessary to maintain functioning or to prevent or slow deterioration.6 3
Current cost-containment efforts, particularly
those directed toward the Medicare home health care
program, have made it financially unattractive to
treat long-term chronically ill patients. Many fiscal
intermediaries, insurance companies, and other
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entities under contract with the Medicare program
to administer the payment of claims, discourage
chronic care claims submissions. The Medicare program has often sent mixed signals about chronic care,
discouraging it on the one hand, while recognizing
its legitimacy in regulations and administrative manuals as descried above.
4.2.1.6. The Homebound Dilemma: Finding a Way to
Define the Service and the Population to Be Served
The Medicare program is restrictive in its eligibility
and access criteria to home health benefits under
Medicare. Current concerns about program growth
and the need to control costs are causing even greater
scrutiny of the benefit and access to it, including ever
more restrictive definitions of the concept of
homebound, being applied by service providers on a
day-to-day basis.
4.2.1.7. Long-Term Care as a Category of Service
Under Medicare: The Current Situation
Currently, the Medicare program does not include
a specific category of services designated as longterm care services. Rather, long-term care services,
are included in the scope of services provided to persons who need chronic care services within the
context of the services available under the home
health benefit6 4 or under other Medicare provisions
allowing for physical, occupational, and speech
therapy services narrowly defined by the Medicare
5
program.
4.2.2. Medicaid
Medicaid is the largest public source of funding for
long-term care in the United States. It accounted for
more than thirty-eight percent of total long-term care
expenditures in 1996. Medicaid spending for longterm care has more than doubled from 1987 to 1997,
rising from $21.1 billion to $56.1 billion. 66 State
Medicaid programs are required to pay for nursing
home care and home health care for individuals who
qualify under the federal and state criteria. 67 States
also have the option of providing services to Medicaid beneficiaries under the Personal Care program
and the Home and Community-Based Care Waiver
program. 68 These programs provide Medicaid eligible
individuals with services that help with activities of
daily living.
The MEDSTAT Group, a private research organization conducting research under a contract with
the Health Care Financing Administration, has found
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that states increasingly are moving toward provision of services in the community through the waiver
programs. Medicaid spending for long-term care
increased 9.3 percent from 1996 to 1997, the highest rate of growth since 1992. Medicaid spending on nursing home care and intermediate care facilities as a proportion of total Medicaid long-term
care spending dropped from 90.2 percent in 1987
to 75.8 percent in 1997. At the same time, home
care spending as a percentage of total Medicaid
spending more than doubled from 10.8 percent to
69
24 percent.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s expenditures
for Medicaid home health services were increasing
annually by twenty percent to twenty-eight percent,
but that began to slow in 1993. According to the
MEDSTAT Group, the lower rates of growth in recent years may reflect the use of strategies by some
states to maximize the use of Medicare home health
benefits for those who are dual eligible. But most
recent data show that long-term care spending was
driven by a large increase in Medicaid home and
community-based care waiver services, which increased by 44.6 percent from 1996 to 1997 ($8.1
70
billion in 1997 from $451 million in 1987).
4.2.3. The Proposed Benefit
The proposed benefit would be known as Medicare
Part D.
4.2.3.1. The Benefit
Under Medicare Part D, each beneficiary would be
entitled to a pool of money (i.e., $200,000 in the
year 2000 and indexed to inflation) to be used as
needed at any level along the continuum of care.
There would be a $10,000 deductible, after which
Medicare would pay eighty percent of the cost of
care. After the pool of money is exhausted, the beneficiary would pay privately or through private
insurance. The Medicaid program would pay for care
for those unable to afford private payment or to
purchase private insurance. Care managers would
assess the beneficiary's condition, develop a written
plan of care, implement and coordinate the care plan,
monitor services, make appropriate reassessments,
and discharge the beneficiary when services are no
longer needed.
Any system of long-term care financing must
ensure that provider payments are adequate to cover
the actual cost of care and provide a reasonable profit
to the provider. The NAELA proposed system would
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spread the risk of care across the population as a whole,
recognizing long-term care as a normal life risk.
4.2.3.2. Eligibility
Physical eligibility would be based on advanced age
limitation of functions (physical and/or mental disability) resulting in the loss of at least two ADLs or an
equivalent disability. The financial eligibility requirements for Medicare Part D would be very similar to
71
the rules for Social Security Disability Income (SSD).
To be eligible for Medicare Part D, a recipient would
be age sixty-five or disabled as defined in Social Security Act. 72 The wage earner must have obtained insured
status by accumulating forty quarters of coverage.73
The spouse or children of a disabled wage-earner would
be eligible provided the spouse or children were sixtyfive years of age or disabled.
4.2.3.3. Financing the Benefit
Medicare Part D would be financed in a manner
consistent with the funding structure used to fund
the current Part A Trust Fund (i.e., payroll taxes).
Increases must be based on sound actuarial principles, in keeping with established notions of social
insurance as currently defined in our Social Security
system. Additionally, receipts from the Federal Estate and Gift Tax would be dedicated toward funding
Medicare Part D.
Since it will take a certain period of time to accumulate sufficient money through additional payroll
taxes to pay for the program, it should be phased in
over a number of years, so that one-half of the program benefits becomes available in ten years and the
second half becomes effective in twenty years. By providing this basic coverage under a modified social
insurance model, the benefits provided by private longterm care insurance would be significantly reduced,
thereby lowering premiums and making them more
affordable to a larger segment of the population.
NAELA proposes that, with the establishment
of Medicare Part D, the Part D program and the
Medicaid program be administered in a manner similar to Medicare. A strong audit system to ensure
compliance and a uniform federal standard of eligibility would be required. Provider reimbursement
rates must be fairly administered and determined,
based on accurate cost information reflecting geographic considerations and severity of conditions.
Additionally, due process requirements must always
be observed.

5. Medicaid Reform
5.1. Structural Components and Observations of
the Current System
The Medicaid system lacks coordination between the
county and state level, between the state agency and
the state legislature, between the state and the federal administrative agencies, and between the federal
administrative agency (HCFA) and Congress. The
current system of Medicaid waivers creates an even
greater lack of continuity. States have great flexibility in denying waiver requests and can limit services
to various populations through the waiver process.
These various breaks in the chain of authority create many discrepancies and ensure inefficiency and
disparate treatment between and within states. States
that are inclined to ignore the process or take shortcuts are unlikely to be penalized, as the federal agency
is also undisciplined in maintaining the appropriate controls and audit procedures. In short, the
system fails.
The management and structure of the Medicare
program versus the Medicaid program creates an
interesting comparison. While the Medicare program
is strictly a federal program that is administered by
the federal government and insurance companies, the
Medicaid program is a joint federal-state program.
While the Medicare eligibility rules are comparatively
straightforward, the Medicaid eligibility rules are
a morass and a mystery to all but a chosen few.
This theme continues into the review and appeal processes where fair hearings are often neither fair nor
appealing.
5.2. The Federal-State Partnership
This concept has created turf wars between the
counties and state governments as well as between
the states and the federal government. Having
reviewed approximately twenty-two state administrative codes in this area, the problems or deficiencies
include:
1. Contradictions within sections of the state Medicaid regulations;
2. Contradictions between the state regulations and
federal statutes;
3. Failure by the HCFA to enforce against those
who have failed to adhere to principles of the
statutory law and to the principals of equal protection and due process;
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4. Failure by state or federal agencies to audit the
policies and procedures of the state agencies; and
5. Uneven application of the same Medicaid regulations within states.
5.3. Suggestions Concerning Structural
Improvements
NAELA makes a number of recommendations pertaining to program administration. While these
recommendations relate to the existing Medicaid
program, the concepts also need to be included in
the proposed Medicare Part D.
5.3.1. Single Source (Long Term)
Legislation previously has been introduced that
would have separated the Medicaid program from
the general welfare programs. The purpose of this
approach was to eliminate many of the positions in
state governments that are duplicative and to establish a single system. Under such a proposal, it would
be possible to either continue using the county governmental structure or contract the administration
to the insurance industry, which has provided an efficient and uniform Medicare administration. It
would be possible to transfer some duties to the companies immediately. While some politicians at the
state level would oppose such an approach, many
middle-class and lower middle-class senior citizens
would benefit. The administration could also be performed by a subagency of the HCFA.
5.3.2. Substantive Model Code (Short Term)
State Departments of Human Services, along with
AARP and groups such as NAELA could work together to create a model code as well as model notices
that could be utilized and would represent a considerable improvement over the program administration
in many states. First, a uniform state Medicaid system must be adopted. During this transition period,
states would be free to determine eligibility standards
within model code sections. By using model code
sections, less effort would be expended and litigation would be less likely. Additionally, in poorer states
or more rural states, the quality of the eligibility determinations would be improved and more credence
given to case law.
5.3.2.1. Government Model
If a government agency such as HCFA is to manage such a program, it would be most efficient to

transfer employees and office space to the federal
government. An intense and ongoing education and
evaluation system would be required. Although this
approach is inconsistent with the Medicare Administrative model, it would still represent an
improvement over the current system.
5.3.3. Model Procedures Act
The adoption of a model act would apply to eligibility determinations for the Medicaid program and
welfare programs. Due process violations at the state
level have been a persistent problem, but for friendly
courts and the Eleventh Amendment could have
caused severe financial distress to many states. By
adopting and conforming to such a model act, the
populace would be better served and state governments could avoid the federal court system. The
model act would include an application process, a
review process, and notice forms, as well as penalties for the failure to comply. The model rules should
also contain strict criteria for assisting with applications and hearings. A model act would alleviate many
of the due process concerns set forth below.
.5.3.4. Auditing System
There must be a system in place to audit compliance
by government agencies. There are two possible
models: a government audit or a private attorney
general model. Procedures must be in place to avoid
easily subverting government auditors.
5.3.4.1. Government Audit
A truly independent auditing agency is recommended. Such an agency should be part of the Justice
Department since it is most familiar with due process issues.
5.3.4.2. Private Attorney General
Under this approach, any party who discovered violations would be permitted to pursue a court action
and would be entitled to attorney's fees or perhaps a
percentage reward. Conceptually, this would be similar to a qui tam action.
5.4. Due Process
The national Medicaid system, as currently structured, denies many applicants the basic and fundamental
right of due process.
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5.4.1. Inconsistent Decisions (intrastate
Administration)
In its present form, the Medicaid system varies significantly across state and even county lines, yielding
inconsistent decisions and unreliable coverage. For
example, the local Medicaid district in New York
City often interprets New York State OBRA '93 eligibility regulations differently than the local district
in Nassau County (a contiguous county). A single,
uniform federal standard of eligibility and administration must be created. These uniform laws and
regulations would offer detailed regulations not only
for approval of Medicaid applications, but also for
the denial of coverage as well as the appeals process.
5.4.2. Reconsideration
After denial of an application, the applicant is entitled to have the application reconsidered by the
worker who performed the initial review. This is inherently unjust, as the worker who rendered the
decision is unlikely to change his or her position.
The review should, instead, be conducted by an independent party, perhaps another worker in a
separate department created solely for the reconsideration of Medicaid denials. This would ensure that
the request for reconsideration is given the serious
attention it deserves. Currently, the reconsideration
process is a mere formality. Every applicant who feels
that his or her decision is in error should be able to
have the decision reviewed and reversed without the
necessity of a formal fair hearingor costly litigation.
This would save time and money for the applicant as well as the local entity that administers the
program.
5.4.3. Fair Hearings
Fair hearings are also often unjust and unfair. Review of the application is customarily performed by
the same agency or subagency that acts as the defendant in the matter. Fair hearings for Medicaid
applicants should be conducted by an independent
administrative law judge like those for Medicare and
worker's compensation cases.
It is important to retain the informal face-to-face
nature of the fair hearing proceeding, so that individuals who cannot afford attorneys could
nevertheless adequately represent themselves. Therefore, complicated rules of evidence should not be
required in a fair hearing setting. However, fair hearing appellants must be given the formal protections
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of a traditional proceeding, including the ability
to conduct a wide array of discovery, such as the
right to subpoena documents, experts, and witnesses. Complete and unencumbered discovery and
disclosures are essential to ensure that substantial
justice and basic due process principles have been
met.
5.4.4. Notices
One of the essential elements of due process is the
right to reasonable notice. However, the notice of
denial proffered by Medicaid is usually difficult to
understand, if not illegible, especially for the
elderly.
Notice of denials must be legible (atleast twelvepoint type), state clearly the reasons for the denial,
inform the enrollee of all appeal rights, explain hearing rights and procedures, and provide instructions
on obtaining supporting evidence. These basic due
process protections must be as easily understood by
an eighty-year-old widow as her thirty-five-year-old
daughter. In the event that the recipient of the notice
is incapacitated or infirm, notice must be given to a
guardian, family member, and/or to a personal advocate for the individual appointed by the local
administering agency. All notices should be given in
the primary language of the applicant.
5.4.5. Failure of Timely Response
Due process also invokes the concept of speedy and
just application of the law. In recognition of this,
Medicaid regulations often include reasonable time
frames with which the agency must comply in order
to ensure that justice is met. Unfortunately, these time
frames are frequently not met. For example, in
Nassau County, New York, an individual will often
have to wait approximately four months just to get
an initial interview with the Department of Social
Services. Further, there typically are no penalties
imposed on the agency administering the Medicaid
program for failing to meet these time frames.
5.4.6. Burden of Proof
There must be a presumption that the applicant is
eligible for assistance. The burden of proof must be
on the administering agency to prove, with clear and
convincing evidence, that the applicant is not eligible.
This strict standard is appropriate as the denial of
benefits literally has life or death consequences for
many individuals.
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11. 42 U.S.C. § 401 etseq.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1 etseq.

6. Conclusion
The current system fails to meet the long-term care
needs of our aging population. Medicaid and longterm care insurance will cover the needed care in
some cases. Medicare Part D will be the solution to
this problem.
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